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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(b)(h).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW:
Issue 1:

Did the Court err in its Findings of Fact?

Determinative Law: There is no constitutional provision, statute,
ordinance, rule or regulation whose interpretation is wholly determinative. Utah R.
Civ. Proc. 52(b) is relevant to the proceeding.
Utah R. Civ. Proc 52 (b) reads:
Rule 52. Findings by the Court:
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury
or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately
its conclusions of law. Thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth
the findings of fact and conclusions of law, which constitute the grounds of its action.
Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the court. It will be
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded
in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enterer findings
of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in rule 41 (b).
The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the grounds for its
6

decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56 and 59 when
the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may
amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for new
trial pursuant to rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court
without a jury, the questions of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings
may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question had made in
the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend
them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce,
findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties ro an issue of
fact:
( c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
( c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause:
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
Standard of Review: The standard of review for a challenge to a trial court's
factual findings is clear error. See, Kessimakis v. Kessimakis. 1999 UT App. 130,
ITS.
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in the trial court at
R. 434-455.
Issue 2:

Whether the trial court erred in failing to award Petitioner
alimony.

Determinative Law: There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to
be wholly dispositive or determinative of this issue presented on appal. U.C. A. §
30-3-5 is relevant and one of central importance to the appeal.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is lengthy and attached as part of the addendum.
Standard of Review: The standard of review for a trial court to fail to award
7

alimony is abuse of discretion. See, Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, fl 42.
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue is preserved in the trial court at R.
488, Trial Transcript, at 132:6, 133:24, 140:12, 226:4,7, 284:15, 287:19, 289:16,
291:20.
Issue 3. Whether the trial court erred in failing to award attorney's fees to
Appellant.
Determinative Law: There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to
be wholly dispositive or determinative of this issue presented on appeal.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 is relevant.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 states,
30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees - temporary alimony.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate
Maintenance, or Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 2, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any
action to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony or division
of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney
fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to enable the
other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include provisions for
costs of the action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent time, child support,
alimony or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and
attorney fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim
or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against
a party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters in the record the reason
for not awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may order a party to provide
money, during the pendency of the action, for the separate support and maintenance
of the other party and of any children in the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the final order or
judgment may be amended during the course of the action or in the final order or
judgment.
8

Standard of Review:

The standard of review is correctness. Jensen v.

Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, H127.
Preserved In the Trial Court: This issue is preserved in the trial court at R.
488, Trial Transcript, at 144:22, 225:6, 228:14, 229:3, 269:14, 276:10, 11, 12, 14,
277:3, 284:18, 289:22, 23, 24 25, 291:18, 293:22.
Issue 4:

Whether the trial court erred in finding certain property to be non-

marital.
Determinative Law: There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to
be wholly dispositive or determinative of this issue presented on appeal.
Standard of Review: A trial court has considerable discretion concerning
property [division] in a divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption of
validity. Elman v. Elman. 2002 UT App 84,1f 17; Consequently, we will not disturb
a property award unless we determine that there has been "a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence
clearly preponderates against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion".

Id. (Quoting Schaumberq v.

Schaumberg. 875 P.598 at 602.
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in the trial court at
R. 488, Trial Transcript, at 14:13-22,16:22,23,17:14-21,18:9,10, 21:13,14,25,2025, 26:10-12, 26:16-19, 25, 30:2,5-7, 9-12, 43:13,14, 45:6-8, 175:10,11,14-22,
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25,177:8,9,10-14, 186:23-25, 187:1, 8-25, 202:6-24, 203:10, 209:9-13, 264:6-8.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A^

Nature of the Case:
This appeal is from a final judgment and order of the Third Judicial District

Court, signed April 2, 2008.
B. Course of the Proceedings and the Disposition Below:
The trial Court awarded the properties located at 149 South 800 East, Salt
Lake City, Utah, and 244-250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake City, Utah, to
Mr. Soderborg, without equitable distribution, as his separate property. The trial
court also ordered no alimony for Mrs. Soderborg, and order each party to pay their
own attorney's fees.
Mrs. Soderborg, through this appeal, is seeking to have an equitable
distribution or set-off of the properties above, is seeking an award of reasonable
alimony, and is seeking to have an award of attorney's fees for the trial court and this
appeal.
(1

Statement of Facts:
1.

The parties to this action were previously husband and wife. The
parties were divorced by a bifurcated decree in this action.( R. at 283284).

2.

Petitioner and Respondent were married on April 2,1988 in Las Vegas,
Nevada. This divorce action was filed on March 31, 2006. (R. at 1-6).
10

3.

One child was born as issue of this marriage, Erik, now age 20. He
was born on November 18, 1988. ( R. at 1-6).

4.

There are four parcels of real property involved in this litigation as
follows:
a.

8526 South Colene Drive, Sandy, Utah 84094,

b.

244-250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake City, Utah 84115,

c.

149 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, and

d.

155-157 South 800 East Salt Lake City, Utah 84102.

(Colleen Drive, Trial Transcript, hereafter T.T., at 32:25, 33:1,2; Truman Ave., T.T.
at 21:6; 149 S. T.T. at 7:6-9; 155-157 South T.T. at 30:13-16,25; 31:1,24,25; 32:1).
5.

For most of the approximately eighteen and one-half year term of this
marriage, the Respondent has failed and refused to seek substantial
gainful employment outside the home and outside managing the
properties.
(got B.S. degree in business from Westminster in 1992, T.T. at 19:23.

20:6; never sought employment with any company or employer who would use
business degree, T.T. at 20:1-10; worked as supervisor of security guards for Davis
Security, 28-30 hours per week, in 1991-1992; T.T.at

20:11-21; had broker's

license, T.T. as 9:11-13; occupation in terms of time and income generated was
owner and operator rental properties, T.T. at 186:23-25; 187:1; his job was the
apartments, T.T. at 209:9-13, even his apartments only generated between 15-20
11

hours per week, T.T. at 177:3-8).
Therefore, virtually his entire labor and contribution to the support of the
family unit during the marriage has been his labor performed improving
the various parcels of rental property, and his labor in managing the
same. (T.T. at 209:9-13) At the time of trial, he was employed part
time with Salt Lake County Recreation. (T.T. at 177:3-14) However,
Respondent received an education during the marriage of the parties,
having achieved a business degree from Westminster College. The
Respondent is able bodied and employable. He has been chronically
underemployed during the entirety of the marriage, and during the
pendency of this action. (See above, and T.T. 30, 13-16, "So by 1994,
your primary occupation was restoring, repairing and managing these
three properties that we've talked about, the 149 South 800 East, 157
South 800 East, and the Truman Avenue property, correct? Yeah, the
Truman property is actually two properties,...".).
6.

The Petitioner was employed by Utah Power and Light Company at the
time of the parties' marriage (T.T. at 192,1-3), but she was
subsequently retired with a medical disability in about 1996, due to a
cancer diagnosis. (T.T. at 182:7-10; 192:11,12; 193:1-25; 194:1-12).
She received income from her disability insurance of approximately
$1,471.00 gross per month. (T.T. at 142:9-11, T.T. at Exhibit R-11).
12

The Respondent claimed that the Petitioner has income from her efforts
to breed and market Shelty puppies, and that she sold two litters in
2007. (T.T. at 167:1-25; 168:1-10) Petitioner does have Shelty dogs,
and her dogs had litters of puppies in 2007. This endeavor is a hobby.
She breeds these dogs and attends shows with the dogs. (T.T. at
196:1-25; 197:1-13) However, given the expenses of attending the
shows, the food and veterinary costs, and equipment costs for the dogs,
this effort is not a profit-making concern. (T.T. at 197:9-13: also, 116:718)
The parties had certain motor vehicles at the time of trial. Specifically,
the Respondent has a 2002 Oldsmobile Alero, a 1985 Dodge Ram
Charger, and a 1964 Chevrolet Corvette. The Petitioner has a 1998
Chevrolet Tahoe and a 1990 Viking fold-up trailer, and a one-half
interest in a 1989 Winnebago motor home. (T.T. at Exhibits R-5, R-7,
R-16, R-18, P-7, P-9, P-11). Petitioner asserts that the values of the
motor vehicles are quite pedestrian, with the exception of the 1964
Chevrolet Corvette. She asserted that the Chevrolet Corvette has a fair
market value of approximately $75,000.00, and that it is a significant
asset in this marriage. (T.T. at Exhibits P-7, P-9; T.T. at 55:14-21,
112:12-16; 113:10,11). The Corvette was acquired during the course
of the marriage and is a marital asset. (T.T. at 113:10).
13

9.

At trial the Court below awarded all the property in U 4 above to
Respondent as a non-marital asset, (excluding the Colene Drive
property) but also awarded Respondent an interest in Petitioner's
premarital Colene Drive home. ( R.at 456-462, Order of Distribution,
Denial of Alimony, and Other Related Matters, p. 2 and 3).

10.

The Court awarded Mrs. Soderborg no alimony ( R. at 456-462, Order

of Distribution, Denial of Alimony, and Other Related Matters, p. 5, paragraph 6).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Ms. Soderborg filed a Verified Petition for Divorce on Petition for Divorce
following an 18 years marriage.
Mr. Soderborg entered the marriage with virtually zero assets, but had
acquired property through inheritance from his father a year before the marriage
located at 149 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. This property was a fiveplex and had been sold to multiple buyers and sellers but was in such a decrepit
condition and out of compliance with City building and zoning codes, that Mr.
Soderborg's father eventually had to take the property back.
The first four years of the marriage Mr. Soderborg devoted his full time
labor to restore and maintain the property and to bring the property into
compliance with City and zoning codes. He paid approximately $4,500 from his
pre-marital assets to his father for this property and claims that the balance of the
property was given to him as part of his inheritance.
14

The property located at 244-250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake
City, Utah, was also owned by Mr. Soderborg's father. His father was unable to
maintain the property and it became uninhabitable and was subject to citations
and liens from the City of South Salt Lake if the property remained unrepaired.
The father was elderly and unable to bring the property up to code. The
Soderborg family had a series of meetings, and Mr. Soderborg agreed to
"purchased" the property as an advance on his inheritance. Following the
collapse of the roof on the property, the final agreed price was $40,000. This
occurred in 1991, three years after the parties were married.
Mr. Soderborg, again, undertook the project of restoring and repairing a
seriously compromised parcel of real estate and his efforts to this end were his
only efforts toward support of his family.
Mrs. Soderborg brought into the marriage a home located at 8526 South
Colene Drive, Sandy, Utah. She had purchased this home with her previous
husband and received it in a previous divorce.
Mr. Soderborg also purchased, during the marriage, a rental property at
157 South 800 East in Salt Lake City. This property was also distressed, did not
meet building codes and was not in compliance with zoning requirements for Salt
Lake City. It has significant value, and has been brought into compliance by the
efforts of Mr. Soderborg.
During the course of the marriage, which was from 1988 through 2006, Mr.
15

Soderborg has maintained a practice of being chronically unemployed or
underemployed. He has refused to seek and obtain any meaningful employment
despite being healthy and well educated, and despite a strong economy at that
time, and a strong employment market. His elective employment has been as a
tennis instructor and a security guard. This elective employment constituted a
minuscule part of the marriage. His acknowledged employment is a property
owner and manager of the properties referenced above.
Mr. Soderborg, as a result of his labor solely during the period of time in
which he was married to Mrs. Soderborg, increased the value of his "separate"
properties, that had virtually no value when he received them as they were
distressed to the point of failing to pass City building ordinances and zoning
codes, yet increased to a value exceeding one million dollars during the
marriage.
Mrs. Soderborg has been classified by her insurance carrier as totally
disabled, and receives a monthly disability check in the amount of $1,470.00.
However, she had accrued a retirement prior to the disability, and the Court
divided the retirement equally, without due consideration that Mr. Soderborg had
accrued no retirement, since his employment was managing the properties.
Mrs. Soderborg is entitled to receive a benefit from the sole contribution to
which Mr. Soderborg made to the marriage, i.e., his labor, and there should be an
equitable division or set-off relating to the "separate" properties, he should pay
16

meaningful alimony in an eighteen and one-half year marriage to Mrs. Soderborg,
who is disabled, and he should contribute to or pay her attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT

The Findings of Fact in which the Court erred will be addressed in the
individual arguments relating to alimony, attorney's fees and separate property
issues.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD PETITIONER
ALIMONY

Alimony is, in effect, a continuation of each spouse's duty to support and
maintain the other. The underlying purpose of alimony is to maintain as nearly as
possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. Paffelv.Paffel. 732 P.2d
96 (Utah 1986), Rudman v. Rudman. 812 P.2d 73 (Utah App. 1991). Alimony is
appropriate "to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from
becoming a public charge". Eamesv.Eames. 735 P.2d 395,397 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987).
Utah trial courts are accorded broad discretion in determining the need and
the amount of alimony payments, and their award will not be disturbed unless a clear
and prejudicial abuse of discretion is shown. Claus v. Claus. 727 P.2d 184 (Utah
1986). However, a trial court must consider three factors in setting a reasonable
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award of alimony: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2)
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or herself:
and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Throckmorton v.
Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, 124, (Ut. App. 1988) quoting Eames. supra, at 397.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5, has since set forth adding, in pertinent part,
(iv) the length of the marriage;
and
( c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living,
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with
Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall consider all relevant factors and
equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living
that existed at the time of trial.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of
both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in
determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been
greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court
may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding
alimony.
Mr. and Mrs. Soderborg were married a total of 18 and one-half years. When
Mr. Soderborg married Mrs. Soderborg, he brought nothing in the way of assets.
(T.T. 202:1-5). When he left the marriage, at the end of 18 years, he had amassed
an approximate gross worth of over one million dollars (adding the appraisals on all
of the properties without deductions for mortgages). This is particularly striking
since, as Mr. Soderborg testified at trial, he had secured a Bachelor's Degree in
Business during the marriage, yet he did not utilize by being paid for that degree by
18

any employer and his employment had been almost uniformly, throughout the
marriage, that of managing his properties. He had a broker's license which he let
lapse for disuse. There have been a brief period where he had worked as a
supervisor of security guards and for the recreation department. His own testimony,
though, was instructive: "Your primary labor during all of that time was to repair, own,
operate, manage these rental units, correct? That, along with the time with Davis
Security, and the buying and selling of cars to generate some income also" (T.T.
186:19-22), and "...by far your primary operation, both in terms of your time and in
terms of the income it generated, was your occupation as an owner and operator
rental property? Yes". (T.T. 186:23-25; 187:1).
On the other hand, Mrs. Soderborg was gainfully employed until stricken with
bone cancer. Her employment was subsequently terminated, and evidence at trial,
by Mrs. Soderborg, was that she is medically disabled (Trial Transcript at 182:9,10
"...she was determined by her disability insurance carrier to be permanently and
totally disabled, correct? Yes") She receives approximately $1,470.00 gross income
per month through the disability insurance she had with a previous employer. This
is her only source of income, and the Respondent's claim that she earns a
substantial income from dogs is specious and unsupported by evidence at trial. (At
best, a one time windfall of approximately $3,400, where the proceeds were eaten
upbythecosts. T.T.at99:16-20;235:22,23;236:1-25;239:6; 196:1-15; 197:5("Do
you make money on the dogs? No"); 197:9-13 ("...everything else with these dogs,
19

there's not much left over").
Mr. Soderborg also offered that Mrs. Soderborg, in addition to selling dogs,
could continue to go to Deseret Industries (D.I. in the trial record), get some great
deals, and turn around and sell these great deals at her own garage sale. ("Well, she
always had something. Before that she was in the practice of - in the summer she
would go around to all the Dl's in the valley, and buy things, and then hold big
garage sales every Saturday on a main street, and she would make money doing
that..."T.T. 168:11-15).
The Court also heard testimony and received evidence that the Respondent
operates multiple rental units; that he has made deductions from his income in a
manner which is not proper and which ought not to be recognized by this Court for
purposes of alimony assessment (T.T. 172-187), and that his income or revenue
from the rental of the properties has been approximately $50-55,000.00 per year, net
of expenses. Further, the evidence also showed that the Respondent is college
educated. Having a degree in business; that he is able bodied; and that he is
employable.

His failure to obtain any significant employment is a willful

underemployment. Income should have been imputed to the Respondent.
The Court also heard evidence that each party has maintained and filed
separate federal and state income taxes during the course of the marriage. The
Respondent falsely contended that this reflects an intention of the Petitioner to keep
their assets separate. In fact, this reflects the Petitioner's belief and opinion that the
20

Respondent was filing income tax returns claiming expenses that were not lawful
deductions, and she refused to participate in this process. (T.T. 172-175; 212:22-25;
213:1-7)
The evidence also showed that Mr. Soderborg has the ability to pay alimony
to Mrs. Soderborg, at the very least from the excessive expenses claimed in
operating and managing the properties. Indeed, the Court, at a prior hearing,
ordered alimony in the amount of $346.00 per month ( R. at 122-127), which was
substantially lower than the $50,000-$55,000 yearly net rental income would allow.
Further, Mr. Soderborg misrepresented to this Court his income and his ability to pay
alimony during the period of temporary alimony in this case. Accordingly, he should
be required to pay alimony based upon his true income, and that alimony should be
increased retroactively to the commencement of temporary alimony in this case.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD PETITIONER
ATTORNEYS FEES
Under Utah law, an award of attorney's fees must be based on "the financial
need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the
reasonableness of the requested fees". Stonehockerv. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App
11,1149.
Substantial attorney's fees have been incurred in this case because of the
Respondent's continuing and unreasonable refusal to recognize the true level of his
income and to acknowledge the marital character of the property. In addition,
21

Petitioner should be awarded her court costs and fees because of the serious
unreporting of an accurate picture of the Respondent's rental income and expenses
as reflected above.
The Findings of Fact relating to attorney's fees, cited at R. 434-455,
specifically paragraph 9 inclusive, is rife with err.
Paragraph 9(A) states that the Court has not received any testimony from any
medical doctor that the Petitioner is disabled to the point where she cannot become
employed, and even marshaling the evidence in favor of this position, which is
essentially a line of questions by opposing trial counsel as to becoming a
receptionist, a computer person or someone who answers telephones (T.T. 229:1025, 230:1-25; 231:1-25; 1-12;) but wholly ignoring that the Petitioner's response.
Her response was that "her doctor won't release me", "there are spots there, but we
haven't actively done anything", "right now there is a spot in my shoulder", and, of
course, "...and then, after that, she was determined by her disability insurance carrier
to be permanently and totally disabled, correct? Yes" (T.T. at 182:7-10).
Indeed, she continues to receive a disability check, every month, in the amount of
$1,470, because she has a disability. In the face of the commonly accepted
actuarially driven insurance carrier, the presumption that they would continue to
maintain disability coverage and payments on someone not disabled, is a virtual
given. That is a reality check not perceived by the lower court at trial.
Petitioner should be awarded her court costs and attorney's fees incurred in
22

this action as they are substantial by reason of the Respondent's unreasonable
positions in this case, and his efforts to "freeze out" the Petitioner financially over the
course of this litigation, both in failing to compromise on alimony when Mrs.
Soderborg has been and is currently categorized as "disabled" and for his equally
obstructive position on his claim of separate property.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING CERTAIN PROPERTY TO
BE NON-MARITAL

Respondent cannot articulate any legal basis upon which he can claim that the
property acquired prior to marriage, or as an advance on inheritance, should not be
equitably divided as marital property, to the extent that such property has enjoyed
an increase in value during this lengthy marriage.
Petitioner concedes that the division of property, under Utah law, is guided by
the general rule that equity requires each party retain what he or she brought into the
marriage. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421,424 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). However,
such property becomes marital property, and thus subject to equitable division when:
(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to
the enhancement, maintenance or protection of that property thereby
acquiring an equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been
consumed or its identity lost through commingling or exchanges or
where the acquiring spouse has made a gift of the interest therein to the
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other spouse. Mortensen v. Mortensen. 760 P.2d 304,308 (Utah 1998)
(citations omitted); and Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 116 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The Mortensen court acknowledged that property divisions in
divorce cases are to be "equitable" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-35. Id. Equitable has been viewed by the Appellate Court, in a number
of cases, and has held, in a more recent case affirming Mortensen, that
"Any significant disparity in the division of the remaining property should
be based on an equitable rationale other than on the sole fact that one
spouse is awarded his or her gifts of inheritance" Stonehocker v.
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, at 483, quoting Mortensen, at 308.
In a 1990 Utah Court of Appeals case, the court looked at the
contribution of the spouse not holding the separate property. The Court
held that "the corporation was founded and operated through the joint
efforts and joint sacrifices of the parties. In addition, because Mr. Dunn
chose to work sixty to seventy hours per week, he left Mrs. Dunn with
the sole responsibility of running the household and managing the
household accounts. Further, she was left without his companionship
and domestic contributions during those hours. While she was not his
partner in the business of orthopedic surgery, she was his partner in the
"business" of marriage"...". Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1318.
Mrs. Soderborg was married to Mr. Soderborg, and for a
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substantial period of time. His efforts to the marriage were to manage
property, and primarily those in which he had a substantial interest by
virtue of his inheritance.
Respondent did not successfully argue during trial that the premarital property
received through an advance on his inheritance was not enhanced through
investments and effort attributable to both parties during the course of the marriage.
Though Petitioner owned certain property before the marriage, this investment
property was enhanced, maintained, and protected through the efforts, both physical
and monetary, of both parties. In fact, the property went from being a "dump" in
violation of City zoning code ordinances, to a property now capable of continuous
rental and capable of generating income. It did so solely and exclusively through the
application of substantial labor of the Respondent. Though the property itself was
a premarital asset, the labor of the Respondent performed during the course of the
marriage was a marital asset. The Petitioner, as the wife of the Respondent for
some 20 years, has been entitled to him to support her and their minor child. The
only real way in which he has done so is to labor upon this property, and the others,
and thereby generate income.
The same can be said of the Truman property which, though received by the
Respondent in the course of the marriage as an advance in his inheritance, was also
in a similar deplorable condition, and in legal jeopardy with the city in which it was
located. Again, though the property was inherited, the Respondent's substantial
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labors performed over many years were not inherited. That labor was a marital
asset.
Petitioner showed during trial, that during the course of the marriage, from
1988 through 2006, the Respondent has maintained a practice of being chronically
employed or underemployed; of refusing to seek and obtain any substantial gainful
employment despite being physically healthy and well educated, and despite a
strong economy and strong employment market. The Petitioner produced evidence
that, despite repeated requests for the Respondent to obtain employment and help
to support the parties' family, he insisted on being "employed" solely and exclusively
on the properties described above, and buying and selling old cars. Also, in the mid
1990's the Petitioner became disable and was no longer able to work for her
previous income. Accordingly, there were insufficient funds needed to support the
parties' minor child, to support their household, and to maintain them in any
acceptable kind of lifestyle. From 1988 through 2006, the Petitioner was forced to
engage in a repetitive practice of taking equity lines against the home to pay debts
and obligations incurred for family and marital expenses. Essentially, by refusing to
obtain employment, and especially by refusing to do so in the face of Petitioner's
disability, the Respondent forced the parties to "cannibalize" the equity in the Colene
property, to support the family. Respondent characterized this as Petitioner's use
of equity in the Colene Drive property to pay off her "separate debts." In fact, these
were marital debts incurred for family necessities, to support the parties and to
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support their then-minor child. Petitioner asserts that the Respondent has wrongfully
failed to support his family during the marriage, and that his claims the mortgage
obligation on Colene should be paid exclusively by the Petitioner are further an effort
on the part of the Respondent to abrogate his support obligations in this marriage.
Therefore, Petitioner asserts that the following is the proper legal conclusions
under the evidence of this case: that the amount of premarital and/or inherited funds
attributable as the value of these properties should be awarded to the Respondent.
However, any accrued value on any of the real estate, whether owned previously,
acquired by an advance on inheritance, or purchased during the marriage, is marital
property. And as such should be divided in an equitable fashion.
Utah case law supports the rule that premarital property should be retained
by the party who brought it into the marriage, but Utah case law is also clear that
appreciation or augmentation in the property is a marital asset. Schaumberq v.
Schaumberq, 875 P.2d 598 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In Schaumberq, the husband
inherited money which he invested in a business building.

After the initial

investment, he refinanced the building several times. The issue in Schaumberq was
whether the husband was entitled to back out and have returned to him more than
the amount of his initial inheritance. The trial court ruled that, even though the
husband used inherited funds to make the down payment on the building, he used
marital funds to maintain and augment the asset. Consequently, the Court of
Appeals found no error in the trial court's determination that appreciated portions of
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the asset changed in character from separate property to marital property.
The instant case is similar. Respondent came to own certain property, wither
by purchasing it prior to the marriage, or by inheriting it during the marriage.
However, he has refinanced the buildings several times. His refinancing under these
circumstances has placed marital assets at risk. He has used a substantial marital
asset (virtually all of his labor for 18 years) to maintain and augment these assets.
Consequently, as in Schaumberq. all appreciation in these properties from the date
of acquisition should be divided between the parties as marital assets.
In the case of Moon v. Moon. 790 P.2d 52, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed
a trial court's division of equity in a home, after awarding to the husband the value
of the land where the home was built gifted to him prior to marriage, finding that the
loan on the home was paid off during the marriage, and, therefore, the increase in
the value beyond the value of the gifted land was marital.
In Barber v. Barber. 792 P.2d 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), the Utah Court of
Appeals affirmed a trial court ruing that the improvements to a home were marital
property and subject to equitable division. Similarly, in the instance case, the very
substantial improvements to these properties, accomplished with the marital assets
of Respondent's labors, render the increase in value to these properties subject to
equitable division. See also Burt v. Burt . 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),
where the Utah Court of Appeals declared that Mr. Burt could have awarded a
portion of Ms. Burt's augmented inheritance under any of the Mortensen exceptions.
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The Court held in Burt that the proper procedure for a trial court to follow is:
The court should properly categorize the parties' property as part of the
marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other. Each
party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property
and fifty percent of the marital property. But rather than simply enter
such a decree, the Court should proceed to effect an equitable
distribution in light of those circumstances and in conformity with our
decision. That having been done, the final step is to consider whether,
following appropriate division of the property, one party or the other is
entitled to alimony. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166.1171, and n. 10 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990).
In the instant case, the fact of the Respondent's chronic unemployment
during the marriage, but his extensive labor performed for these properties,
is an "exceptional circumstance" within the meaning of Burt and irrespective
of any other consideration.
A. 149 South 800 East Property
Respondent obtained a five-plex located at 149 South 800 East in Salt
Lake City, immediately prior to the parties' marriage. He then devoted his
entire labor for the first four years of the marriage toward the maintenance and
restoration of this property, and the "legalization" of this property with the Salt
Lake City government. He did virtually nothing else to contribute to the
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support of the family during this time frame. Petitioner established during trial
that this project involving the five-plex located at 149 South 800 East
consumed the Respondent's full-time labors for years, and, thereafter, his
general management and maintenance of all the properties has been his sole
occupation. (Physical condition of the property a wreck, T.T. 14:13; ...get
property habitable, T.T. 18:14-21; Performed lion's share of the labor, T.T.
18:9,10; distressed property, T.T. 21:13,14; He personally performed labor on
property to repair and restore, T.T. 25:20-25; Performed a lot of physical labor
on the property, T.T. 26:10-12; Those 2 properties occupied your time more
or less on a full time basis for a period of time? Yes. T.T. 26:16-19; ..it's
ongoing, T.T. 26:25; personally maintained and general upkeep of property,
T.T. 30:13,14; All real estate all in the process of being worked on, T.T.
175:10,11,14-22; I've done all the labor, T.T. 175:25; Not sought any other
employment other than part time with recreation department? No. T.T. 177:1014; [your] occupation in terms of time and income generated was owner and
operator of rental property? Yes. T.T. 186:23-25; 187:1; at the time of the
marriage, David had no money, T.T. 202:6-24; Who was supporting the
household when you first got married? I was [Mrs. Soderborg], T.T. 202:3-5;
I paid for everything [Mrs. Soderborg], T.T. 203:7.
The five-plex located at 149 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, was
originally owned by Respondent's father, George L. Soderborg. The evidence
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during trial showed that, in the early 1980's, Respondent's father sold the
property and then the property was subsequently sold and resold to others in
a change of multiple buyers and sellers, apparently pursuant to Utah Uniform
Real Estate contracts. By 1987, the property was in decrepit condition and
was not in compliance with the City building and zoning codes. The
Respondent's father was forced to accept back the property, as various
buyers in the chain of title refused to comply with the contracts due to the
noncompliance of the property with building and zoning codes, and defaulted
in their obligations. Eventually, Respondent agreed to take over the problems
of the property, to repair it, to petition the City to seek compliance with the
building and zoning ordinances. He made a deal with his father to take over
ownership of the property in 1987, approximately one year prior to the
marriage of the parties.
Thereafter, as set forth above, he labored for many years during the
marriage, to resolve the zoning compliance problems, to repair and restore
the property, to make it habitable, and lawful for human occupation, and to
render it an income producing property. He paid only $4,500.00 from his
premarital assets to his father for the property at 149 South 800 East.
Respondent falsely asserted that the balance of the value of the property was
given to him as part of an inheritance. However, the accounting of the
inheritance acknowledged by Respondent in discovery, does not reflect he
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received any of this property as an advance on his inheritance. Petitioner
asserts that his claims that he took this property as an advance on inheritance
are recently fabricated claims in the face of this divorce action. The evidence
at trial showed the more likely reality that he paid back his father over time out
of the marital funds.
Respondent has kept the property at 149 South 800 East solely in his
name, and has kept separate bank accounts during the course of the
marriage. However, his only contribution to the support of his family during
the marriage, of any substance, has been the labor performed to repair this
property, and others, and to operate these properties as rental units. The
Respondent's marital labor has greatly enhanced the value of this property.
Because the value of the property has been significantly enhanced by a
marital asset of the parties (the Respondent's labor during the marriage), the
Petitioner is entitled to an equal share of the value of the property, less its
premarital value of $4,500.00, as a marital property distribution.
B. 244-250 East Truman Avenue Property
The property located at 244-250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake
City, Utah, was also owned by the Respondent's father, George L. Soderborg.
The Respondent's father was eventually not able to maintain this property and
it became uninhabitable, in dire need of substantial repairs, and was subject
to citations and attempts by the government of the City of South Salt Lake, to
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fine Respondent's father and lien the property if the property was not repaired
and maintained. At the time of these occurrences, the Respondent's father
was quite elderly and not capable of complying with the City's request for
maintenance of the property.

After as series of family meetings, the

Respondent was the only sibling family member interested in the property and
willing to take on the project of repairing the property.

He agreed to

"purchase" the property for $40,000.00 as an advance on his inheritance, this
final price having been determined after the roof on the property collapsed.
After acquiring this property as an advance on his inheritance, the
Respondent, once again, undertook the project of restoring and repairing a
seriously compromised parcel of real estate. During the time frame of this
activity, the Respondent's only labor performed of any significance was to
repair and restore the Truman Avenue property. The reason the property is
in rentable condition is that a marital asset, all the labor and efforts of the
Respondent, to the exclusion of other efforts to support his family, went
exclusively into this property. The Petitioner therefore asserts that a marital
asset has gone to the significant repair and an increase in value of this
property. Other than the initial $40,000.00 advance on inheritance, the
Truman property is a marital asset.
C. 8526 South Colene Drive Property
Petitioner brought into this marriage a home located at 8526 South
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Colene Drive, Sandy, Utah, which she had purchased with her previous
husband and which was awarded to her in a previous divorce. The fair market
value of this property at the time of the parties' marriage was $90,200.00.
D. 157 South 800 East Property
During the marriage, the Respondent purchased a rental property at
157 South 800 East in Salt Lake City. It was also a derelict or distressed
property, which did not meet building code and was not in compliance with
zoning requirements for Salt Lake City. Respondent has corrected that
problem. The property is clearly a marital asset and has been appraised at
the value of the real estate (dirt) only, by an appraiser, at approximately
$210,000.00.
Trial courts "need to be guided by the general purpose to be achieved
by a property division, which is to allocate the property in a manner which best
serves the needs of the parties and best permits them to pursue their separate
lives". Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, at 1148, quoting Burke v. Burke.
733P.2d 133, 135.
Also, in a concurring opinion, Justice Zimmerman in the Mortensen v.
Mortensen case previously cited, states, "I certainly do not read the majority
opinion as creating an exalted status for inherited or donated property that
would effectively entail it or its value beyond the reach of a trial court
fashioning a divorce decree. The overarching general rule remains the same
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in any divorce case: to provide adequate support for the children of the
marriage (cite omitted) and to divide the economic assets and income stream
of the parties so as to permit both to maintain themselves after the marriage
as nearly as possible at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage".
Mortensen, at 310.
CONCLUSION:
When Mr. Soderborg entered the marriage with Mrs. Soderborg on
April 2, 1988, he entered the marriage with virtually the clothes on his back.
At the end of the marriage, he had accumulated property in an amount
exceeding a million dollars.
He leaves the marriage able bodied and capable of full time
employment. He has no illnesses nor debilitating health issues. He has
his Corvette to drive.
Mrs. Soderborg, on the other hand, has bone cancer, albeit current
non-active. What retirement she accumulated is to be divided one-half with
Mr. Soderborg, who, because he focused his labors on increasing the
values of the properties he managed and didn't work during the marriage
except in isolated instances, didn't acquire any retirement and has nothing
to split with Mrs. Soderborg.
Mrs. Soderborg receives a monthly disability check in the amount of
$1,470, a substantial reduction from the $20 per hour she had made while
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gainfully employed with Utah Power and Light. With Utah Power and Light,
at $20, she was making a monthly income of $3,467. Because of her
disability, she has a monthly net loss of almost $2,000 a month.
Mr. Soderborg would have Mrs. Soderborg supplement her disability
income by selling dogs, a hobby she has, and which, according to trial
testimony, she made all of approximately $3,400 when she sold 7 pups.
Mr. Soderborg would also have Mrs. Soderborg resort to her past endeavor
of shopping at Deseret Industries for specials, and then conducting garage
sales on all of the items in which she was able to get a deal from the thrift
store. This is his suggestion for her to make up the $2,000 she has lost as
income because of her cancer. He proposed not to pay her any alimony,
nor to share in any interest appreciation, at the very least, on all of the
effort he put in in managing the properties. He proposed not to share any
portion of all of the properties he received from inheritance.
The primary asset in this case, by Mr. Soderborg, has been his labor.
His entire economic contribution, as an employee, as a laborer, as a
worker, as a business owner, was the labor he performed on the properties
he acquired and managed. This is a man of some skills, who completed
his business degree while married to Mrs. Soderborg, continued to acquire
additional properties while married to Mrs. Soderborg, continued to
improve on these properties to where initially, they had no value and were
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a literal eyesore in the eyes of the City and violative of City ordinances and
zoning codes to where, after 18 years, their value surpasses a million
dollars.
Mrs. Soderborg has shown a need for alimony, and Mr. Soderborg
has an ability to pay, and Mrs. Soderborg should be entitled, because of
her commitment to the marriage, to the standard to which she had become
accustomed over eighteen years. Mr. Soderborg, because he has the
ability to pay and Mrs. Soderborg has a need for payment, should pay Mrs.
Soderborg's attorney's fees for trial.
Finally, because it is a matter of simple fairness and only equitable,
Mrs. Soderborg should share in the separate property acquired by Mr.
Soderborg's marital labor.
DATED this 4th day of May, 2009.
MORRISON & MORRISON, L.C.

Grant W. P. Morrison
Matthew G. Morrison
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
A. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
B. Utah R. Civ. P. 52
C. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
D. Order of Distribution, Denial of Alimony, and Other
Related Matters
E. Order from Hearing Held May 3, 2006
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30-3-5. Disposition of property -- Maintenance and health care of parties and
children - Division of debts -- Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and
parent-time - Determination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties The court shall include
the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary
medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for
the dependent children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regard!! n i II ie
court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate,
current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chaptei I Recovery
Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning
financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If
the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent
children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial
parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for
the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the
mother and father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by
modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights ot grandparents
and other members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of the
child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the
court may include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision,
among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or
visitation schedule entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order
is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys'
fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition
was without merit and not asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a
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visitation order by a grandparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation
or
parent-time right has been pieviously granted by the court, the court may award to the
prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the
prevailing party because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered
visitation or parent-time
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in iM<jriinninq alimony
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support;
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor
spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor
spouse to attend school during the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time
of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the
court shall consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion,
base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may
consider the standard of living that existed at the time of the marriage.
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equdllLH !!H J parties'
respective standards of living.
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in
the income of one of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be
considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses
during the marriage, the court may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital
property and awarding alimonv
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children
have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each
party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage.
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable
at the time of the divorce.
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs
of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify that action
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not
be considered, except as provided in this Subsection (8)
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's tin 1111 i<il dbilil iU\ JUIIM I m \q
expenses.
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that
the payor's improper conduct justifies that consideration.
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(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time.
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that
a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or
death of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab
initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the
action of annulment and his rights are determined.
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with
another person.
Amended by Chapter 129, 2005 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 30 03 000500.ZIP 5,168 Bytes
Sections in this ChapterlChapters in this TitlelAII TitlesILegislative Home Page
Last revised: Friday, December 17 ' i if I I
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Rule 52. Findings by the court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and
state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and
recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the
court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule
41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under
Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the motion is based on more Mian one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its
findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with a motion for a
new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has
made in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for fudgment, r r
a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of iaw may
be waived by the parties to an issue of fact:
(c)(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(c)(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(c)(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in tli
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IN THF THTRB JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OT SALT LAKE COUNTY
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA SODERBORG,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF L A W

Petitioner,
vs.
Civil No 064901622
DAVID S. SODERBORG,
Respondent.

Honorable Robert P. Faust
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey

THIS MATTER having come on regularly for trial on the 21 st day of February 2008 and by
a t j!ephoiiL conjnence on the

lld

lis i>( 1* tun in n 0PS tot a inlii » in 1hc m Utci all before the

Honorable Robert P. Faust, Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG appearing in person and by and
through her attorney of record, Mar> < < oipoion ut < < »RPC >1!< i J t\

}}

I! i I \MS \} < and

Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG appearing in person and by and through his attorney, Paul
I! Liapis of PAUL H. LIAPS, L.C., and each of the parties having been duly sworn and examined

under oath,.and expert lestimony having baen received by line Conn, and JncunioiUav e\i(luiee
having been marked and received by the Court, and the parties having been previously divorced
- ..:•.! A ,iijutLn:--a uctrcc oi :)ivorce entered on the 15th day of December 2007, and the Court
having heard arguments of counsel for Petitioner and Respondent, andb i\ ine ;; r<.\ •.•<]: v :v ' ^ 1
sufficiency of the evidence so adduced, and being folly advised in the premises, the Court does now
make, adopt, and find the follov • ing:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

^moner and Respondent have been bona fide and actual residents of Salt Lake

County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months immediately prior to the filing of Petitioner's
Complaint and Respondent's Counterclaim herein.
2.

Petitioner and R espondent are husband and w if e, ha\ ing been married on the 2nd day

of April 1988 in Las Vegas, Nevada and having separated on April 8, 2006.
3.

One (1) child was born as issue of this marriage, namely, Erik P., now age nineteen

(19), and emancipated.
4

The Court makes the following findings with regard to the real property acquired by

(A;

The Court finds that this property was acquired by the Respondent prior to

this marriage arid specifically from his father, George L. Soderborg, pursuant to a handshake

agreement reached by them in Ibo/. ] ' • * : '

!"*

l

• '• '• j . '\-:*y

• ;<j ->• * u « i " - i .-»;

previously to that agreement sold the property to several different buyers and that all sales
failed, and the proper ty \ as taken back by Respondent' s father in 198 7
(B)

I he Court finds that in 1987, the Respondent used the interest owed in a

premarital condominium located at 5910 South Sultan Circle. Murray, Utah to initi -ih

finds Respondent transferred cash of $4500 toward the purchase and received the balance of
I lie value ol that property from., his father as a gift and/or his inheritance.
(C)

The Court finds that the Respondent thereafter opened a separate bank

account solely in his name with First Federal Savings & Loan, no. 680030958, and that all
is for the repairs, rentals, and obligations were processed through that accoi mtsoleh < b;; r
the Respondent. The Court farther finds that the successor bank account with America First
Credit Union., no.74600-884987 7, has-likewise been maintained solely in the name of the
Respondent and that all subsequent monies collected and/or paid for this property have been
deposited into that account and distributed from that account solely under the name of the

(1);

The Court finds that the Petitioner has never placed any monies into the

operation and maintenance of this property, has never

3

WOPKCJ

to repair and maintain this

proreity. his-vv/i-• »li. * >< -v

•

. •

\

d/v: '

b

«* i

noway

has enhanced the value of this property through her efforts, investment, or actions.
fl1

~ '..u'.:; i. sawa iinds that this property has not been commingled in any way

by the Respondent in his operation of this property.
(F)

The Court finds that the Respondent has maintained this rental property, its

bank accoi mt, the fi iiids collected, and its obligations sepai ate and apart throughout the
course of this marriage.
(( J i

J he Court finds that the Respondent has maintained this property separate and

apart and that the property should be n\, in1 *

;-: -i

f

;^

premarital property, free and clear of any interest of the Petitioner.
5.

Hit" i \ iiirt make;, the follow in^ findings with regard to the real property acquired by

the parties during the course of the marriage located at 244-250 East 1 iimiai.

,

--^- .•::

Lake5 Utah:
i Ai

IheCoiiii finds llial ilns property was inhetiU'il h\ (lie Respondent Ironi Ins

father, George L. Soderborg. The Court finds that initially in the spring of 1991, the
Respondent's father appi oached R espondent to assist him with his property in its then state
of disrepair.
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(B) . lV--r

'tv]i^-'-^lvP^.'r.!-i

?hi^< - \

••* ^ > e ^ . i . . f u s i n g

the best manner in which to handle this property and subsequently held a meeting and an
inspection of the property, • and. from that concluded that none of Respondent's siblings
wanted the property and that the Respondent would purchase this property for $45,0001 ising
his inheritance from his father to purchase the property. The Court further finds that shortly
thereafter., fhernot'tollapMitl, .md (he property's \ aim: was i educed to $40,000 by agreement
of his siblings.
(C)

I r.c court lunhcr finds that upon the death of the Respondent's father, the

sum of $40,000 was deducted from the Respoinlnif • shnre ni'the probate estule and Mnt in
addition to that $40,000 value, the Respondent received the sum of $26,266 which he has
invested either iniu this pioperl v • T iiiln the Petitioner's premarital home.
(D)

The Court finds that the Respondent initially acquired an obligation solely in

his name with Beneficial Mortgage Company of Utah in the sum of $ 19,600 to begin repairs
of this propei ty. ' rhat obligation w as si ibsequently revised on Februai y 18, 1.994 I he Court
finds that both such obligations were solely in the name of the Respondent, that Petitioner
ha.> ne^ -: : j--e {:e>piy.^ibii;i> : -• c;: . -\ Mans nor in any way has she ever made payments
toward this, obligation.
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(E)

The Court finds that the Respondent opened a bank account with JP

Morgan/Chase Bank, no. 913349877, in his sole name and has utilized that account in the
operation of this property. The Court further finds that the funds collected from this rental
property and the monies paid toward the costs to operate this rental has all been deposited
into and paid from this account by the Respondent.
(F)

The Court finds that Petitioner in no way has contributed to or invested any

monies into this property or the property's bank accounts, has not repaired, maintained, or
rented the property, has not collected any rental income from the property, and in no way has
enhanced the property during the course of this marriage.
(G)

The Court finds that the Respondent has not commingled this property or its

bank accounts in any way during the course of this marriage.

The Court finds the

Respondent has deposited all of the rentals into the Chase Bank account, has paid all
Jj^^JT expenses for the operation of this company from the Chase Bank account, and that the
Petitioner in no way has become involved or invested any monies into this account.
(H)

The Court finds that this property was initially owned by the Respondent's

grandparents, who passed this property to Respondent's parents, and subsequently to the
Respondent in the manner set forth above.
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(I)

The Court finds that the Respondent has maintained this property separate and

apart and that the property should be awarded to the Respondent as his inherited property,
free and clear of any interest of the Petitioner.
6.

The Court makes the following findings with regard to the real property located at

8526 South Colene Drive, Sandy, Utah:
(A)

The Court finds that the Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG initially

acquired this home in 1978 from a former father in law.
(B)

The Court finds that on April 1, 1987, approximately a year prior to the

parties' marriage, the Petitioner borrowed $64,000 from National Mortgage Company against
this property which she had previously owned free and clear.
(C)

The Court finds that the parties married on April 2, 1988.

(D)

The Court finds that the Petitioner approached the Respondent in the latter

part of the year 1989, inquiring of his interest to invest monies into this home to purchase
one-half QA) of the equity at that time. The Court finds that the parties conducted such a
meeting and concluded that one-half (Yz) of the then equity would be $20,000. The Court
further finds that the parties agreed that Respondent could pay that $20,000 investment over
a period of time and that he initially paid to the Petitioner two (2) checks in the sum of $9500
and $500 cash which he borrowed from his father, for a total payment of $ 10,000. The Court
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further finds the check for $5,000 was dated December 29,1989 and the check for $4500 was
dated January 26,1990 and that Respondent then paid the additional $500 cash to complete
the first half of the payment.
(E)

The Court finds that the title in this property has remained in Petitioner's

name throughout the term of this marriage.
(F)

The Court finds that during the marriage, the Petitioner refinanced the home

withNAMC on June 14,1993, borrowing $74,250. The Court finds that Petitioner paid the
balance of the first mortgage and used the additional monies borrowed to pay off her sole and
separate credit cards and debts, and that this loan was taken solely by Petitioner without the
knowledge of the Respondent.
(G)

The Court finds that Respondent then advanced payment of the second half

of his $10,000 equity purchase in 1998, making payment for the purchase of a new furnace
in the sum of $1750, new carpeting for the house in the sum of $2,141, painting of the
interior of the home in the sum of $1,045, installation and finishing of hardwood floors of
$750, installation of new tiles of $357, installation of central air conditioning of $2,573, the
purchase of a new refrigerator for $751, the purchase of additional furniture from RC Willey
of $830, and the purchase of a new dryer in the sum of $318.36, for a total additional
investment of $ 10,515.36.
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(H)

The Court finds that Petitioner, again without Respondent's knowledge, took

an equity line loan against the home on March 8, 2001 with America First Credit Union in
the sum of $25,000 using those monies to pay off her sole and separate debts and credit
cards.
(I)

The Court finds that on November 22, 2004, Petitioner again refinanced the

America First Credit Union equity line, borrowing $30,000, using said monies to pay off the
balance of the old credit line of approximately $25,000 and the remaining sum of
approximately $5,000 was used to pay off her sole and separate debts and credit cards.
(J)

The Court finds that Petitioner and Respondent jointly contributed to the

mortgage payments from the marriage until November 1994 when the Respondent then
assumed payment of all of the monthly mortgage payments and utilities up to the date of the
parties' separation on April 8, 2006.
(K)

The Court finds that without the knowledge of Respondent, Petitioner again

refinanced the first mortgage on the home on March 22, 2006 with Homecoming Financial
Network borrowing $164,500. The Court finds that this mortgage was done one (1) month
prior to the parties' separation.
(L)

The Court further finds that from the newly financed proceeds, the Petitioner

paid the prior first mortgage of $61,413.43, paid off the America First Credit Union line of

9

credit of $45,747.03, and paid off additional credit cards and debts solely in her name of
$52,227.65.
(M)

The Court further finds that Respondent has presented evidence and

documents setting forth the use by Petitioner of the additional monies borrowed from the
refinance of the home on March 22,2006 to pay her sole and separate debts. The Court finds
Petitioner used those proceeds to pay her credit cards and debts for the following:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
xi.
xii.
xiii.
xiv.

(N)

Payment of food charges
Medical expenses
Computer purchase and repair expenses
Home repairs
Food for the minor son Erik
Auto repairs for her vehicle
Gold's Gym membership
Payment to the Petitioner's Chase credit
card, no. 40800111616965
Payments to Petitioner's Bank of America Visa
account no. 4427-1000-2906-6185, of $9,597.67
Payments to three (3) America First obligations
($5,048 + $4,301.47 + $5,035.23)
Payment of Petitioner's Mervyn' s account
Payment of Petitioner's Capital One charge
Payment of Petitioner's AT&T credit card,
no. 5491-1303-5433-6174
Payment of bicycles
TOTAL:

$ 681.80
$ 736.26
$ 1,084.41
$10,379.69
$ 774.81
$ 5,202.91
$ 589.50
$ 8,689.00
$ 9,597.67
$ 14,384.70
$
$

464.54
671.00

$ 8,957.00
$ 325.41
$62,538.70

The Court finds that the Petitioner improperly and without the knowledge of

the Respondent has used a portion of his equity in the refinancing which occurred on March

10

22, 2006, a month prior to the filing of the divorce in this matter, and that the Respondent
should not be penalized by the Petitioner's unilateral acts of borrowing these monies for the
payment of her sole and separate debts. The Court finds that to determine the equity of this
home, the mortgage balance owing prior to the taking of this refinanced mortgage on March
22,2006 should be the mortgage balance used and subtracted from the appraised value in the
determination of the marital equity in this home.
(O)

The Court finds that by the actions of the parties and their agreement to allow

Respondent to purchase into the equity of this home and that by the subsequent payments of
monies made by Respondent for the mortgage, improvements, and repairs, including an
additional $11,031.25 that Respondent invested in this home between March 30, 1990
through June 22, 2005, that the parties are equal owners in this home and that it is entirely
a marital asset.
(P)

The Court finds that the home was appraised by Mr. Jerry Webber for

^275,000, that the marital equity in this home is the sum of $174,982, and that each party is
an equal owner of this equity.
(Q)

The Court finds that this property should be awarded solely to the Petitioner

It the value of $174,982 and that she should assume and pay all of the mortgage, debts, and
obligations against this property and hold the Respondent harmless therefrom.
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7.

The Court makes the following findings with regard to the real property acquired by

the parties during the course of the marriage located at 157 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah:
(A)

The Court finds that the Respondent purchased this unit under a Uniform Real

Estate contract during the course of the marriage for $65,000.
(B)

The Court finds this property to be a marital acquisition. The Court finds this

property to have been appraised by Mr. Jerry Webber for a value of $219,200 based solely
upon the value of the raw land and not any improvements thereon, and that there exists a
current mortgage balance owing to Mr. Grant Maxwell of $28,681, resulting in an equity in
this property of $181,319. The Court further finds that Mr. Webber's appraisal noted the
zoning problems for this property and his conclusions that the best way to value this property
was for the value of the raw land.
(C)

Thf> Court finds this to be a marital property which equity should be divided

oetween the parties.
8.

The Court makes the following findings with regard to the personal property acquired

by the parties during the course of the marriage:
(A)

The Court finds that the Petitioner has acquired a Pacific Corp/Rocky

Mountain Retirement Account with a current balance of $24,454, plus appreciation since the
statement's date. The Court finds this to be a martial asset and that the account should be

12

awarded to the Petitioner at the stated value.
(B)

The Court finds that the Petitioner during the marriage has acquired a 1998

Chevrolet Blazer four-door LS four-wheel drive vehicle which is valued at $6450, a 1990
Viking fold-up trailer valued at $1500, and a one-half QA) interest in a 1989 Winnebago
motor home with a value of $5,000 and that these vehicles should be awarded to the
Petitioner at the stated values.
(C)

The Court finds that the Respondent during the marriage acquired a 2002

Oldsmobile Alero automobile valued at $4,912, a 1964 Chevrolet Corvette V-6 automobile
valued at $50,000, and a 1985 Dodge Ramcharger valued at $1,000 and that these vehicles
should be awarded to Respondent at the stated values.
(D)

The Court finds that the Petitioner owns seven (7) Shelty dogs, indoor and

outdoor kennels and equipment which the Court finds has a value of $4500 which items
should be awarded to the Petitioner at the stated value.
(E)

The Court finds that Petitioner currently has in her home furniture,

furnishings, and appliances valued at $6500 and that said property should be awarded to the
Petitioner at the stated value.
(F)

The Court finds that the Respondent has a small amount of furniture in his

apartment which should be awarded to him with a value of $500.
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(G)

The Court finds that to equalize the division of these personal property items,

the Respondent should pay to the Petitioner the sum of $9,673.
9.

With regards to the Petitioner's health and income, the Court makes the following

findings:
(A)

The Court finds that Petitioner has not received any testimony from any

medical doctor that the Petitioner is disabled to the point where she cannot become employed
and can contribute to her own earnings.
(B)

The Court finds that the Petitioner's current receipt of disability from a private

insurance carrier does not convince the Court that her subsequent employment would
disallow her receipt of disability from that private insurance policy under the laws of the
State of Utah. The Court further finds that the Petitioner has not proven that she is unable
to work.
(C)

The*Court finds the Petitioner's current yearly income from her private

insurance disability to be $17,652 per year, without consideration of any additional income
shFm^denve from her dogs, the sale of puppies, or other ventures that she was engaged in
during the marriage.
(D)

The Court finds that the Petitioner's net yearly net income is almost equal to

^ R e s p o n d e n t ' s 2007 income of $19,321.
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(E)

The Court finds that any shortfall in earnings as a comparison between the

Respondent's earnings and Petitioner's earnings can clearly be compensated to Petitioner by
her ability to become employed.
(F)

The Court specifically finds that the Petitioner is underemployed by at least

"the difference between the Respondent's gross monthly income and the Petitioner's gross
monthly income.
(G)

The Court finds that the Petitioner has not proven a need for support nor an

ability on the part of the Respondent to pay alimony and therefore denies the award of any
alimony to the Petitioner.
(H)

The Court has reviewed the Petitioner's and Respondent's average living

expenses and finds those expenses to be reasonable for each party.
10.

With regards to the Respondent's earnings, the Court finds:
(A)

That the Respondent's adjusted gross monthly income from the three (3)

apartment units is $2,487.72 and that from said amount, taxes should be deducted which
would then reduce his income to the sum of $1932 per month.
(B)

The Court finds that the Respondent during the pendency of this matter was

forced to acquire a second job to assist in the payment of the alimony that was awarded to
Petitioner under the temporary order.

15

(C)

The Court finds that the Respondent does not have the ability to contribute

support to the Petitioner in the form of alimony.
(D)

The Courtfindsthat the Respondent does not have a need for alimony from

the Petitioner nor has he proved an ability for Petitioner to pay him alimony.
(E)

The Court denies the award of any alimony to either the Petitioner or the

Respondent.
(F)

The Court has reviewed the Respondent's average living expenses and finds

those expenses to be reasonable.
11.

The Courtfindsthat the Respondent has disclosed his current debts and obligations

as follows:
CREDITOR

PURPOSE

MONTHLY

BALANCE

Home Savings
Grant Maxwell
Beneficial Finance
Discover Card
Chase MasterCard

Mortgage -149 South
Mortgage -157 South
Credit Line-Apartments
Credit Line
Credit Line

$
$
$
$
$

$ 115,998
$ 28,681
$ 44,983
$ 2,313
$ 4,276

965.64
530.00
475.55
100.00
400.00

The Courtfindsthat the Respondent should assume and pay these debts and obligations and
hold the Petitioner harmless therefrom.
12.

The Courtfindsthat the Petitioner's debts and obligations are afirstmortgage on the

home at852?TS8!IllnColene Drive, Sandy, Utah with GMAC Mortgage of approximately $164,000
and should assume said obligation and hold the Respondent harmless therefrom. The Court further
16

finds that Petitioner should assume and pay any taxes and insurance on the home and hold the
Respondent harmless therefrom. The Court further finds that Petitioner should assume and pay any
debts and obligations she has incurred in her own name since the separation of the parties in this
matter, and she should hold the Respondent harmless therefrom.
13.

The Court finds that each party has incurred attorney fees and that each party should

assume and pay their own attorney fees and costs. The Court finds that neither Petitioner nor
Respondent has the ability to pay one another's attorney fees. The Court further finds that the
Petitioner has an outstanding attorney's lien to former counsel Richard S. Nemelka and that said
obligation should be assumed and paid by Petitioner and she should hold Respondent harmless
therefrom.
14.

The Court finds that Petitioner desires to be restored to her former name of Barbara

Ray.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and adopts its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG is awarded the following premarital/inherited

assets that he brought into the marriage as his sole and separate property, free and clear of any
interest of the Petitioner:
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(A)

The property located at 149 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, together

with the obligation owing thereon to Home Savings, the taxes, and all other debts and
obligations owing thereon.
(B)

The property located at 244-250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake, Utah,

together with the obligation owing thereon to Beneficial Finance, the taxes, and all other
debts and obligations owing thereon.
(C)

The bank account with America First Credit Union for the property at 149

South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
(D)

The bank account with Chase Bank/JP Morgan used for the property at 244-

250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake, Utah.
(E)

All of the furniture, furnishings, appliances, and fixtures in both parcels of

real property referenced in this paragraph.
2.

Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG is awarded the following assets as the marital

division herein;
(A)

The real property located at 8526 South Colene Drive, Sandy, Utah, together

with all the obligations, taxes, and insurance owed thereon and free and clear of any interest
of the Respondent.
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(B)

All of furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and appliances currently in the home.

(C)

The 1998 Chevrolet Blazer automobile,

(D)

The 1990 Viking folding trailer.

(E)

Petitioner's one-half Q/i) interest in the Winnebago motor home.

(F)

Her banking and depository accounts with America First Credit Union and

Credit Union One.
(G)
3.

Her personal effects and belongings.

Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG is awarded the following assets as the marital

division herein;
(A)

The rental property located at 157 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah,

together with all the furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and items in the rental unit and subject
to the Respondent's making of the first mortgage payment to Grant Maxwell, all taxes and
insurance, and any other obligations owing thereon.
(B)

The 2002 Oldsmobile Alero automobile.

(C)

The 1964 Chevrolet Corvette automobile.

(D)

The 1985 Dodge Ramcharger.

(E)

His personal banking and depository accounts with Wells Fargo Bank.

(F)

The furniture, furnishings, and appliances currently in his possession.
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(G)
4.

His personal effects and belongings.

To equalize the division of the marital estate, Respondent is ordered to pay to

Petitioner the sum of $9,673.
5.

Petitioner and Respondent are each ordered to sign all quit-claim deeds and titles

necessary to transfer the real and personal property into the name of the party receiving these items.
6.

Neither Petitioner nor Respondent is awarded any alimony from the other, and that

right is hereby terminated.
7.

Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG is ordered to assume, pay, and hold the

Respondent harmless therefrom the first mortgage on the home at 8526 South Colene Drive, Sandy,
Utah with GMAC Mortgage, the taxes and insurance on the home, all of the credit cards, debts, and
obligations Petitioner currently has in her name and which she has incurred during the marriage and
those incurred following the separation, together with all attorney fees and costs incurred in this
matter including the attorney's lien owed Richard S. Nemelka, Esq.
8.

Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG is ordered to assume, pay, and hold the

Petitioner harmless from the mortgage owing to Home Savings on the property at 149 South 800
East, the Uniform Real Estate Contract amount owed Grant Maxwell for the purchase of the property
at 157 South 800 East, the Beneficial Finance credit line used in conjunction with the apartments,
the Respondent's Discover Card, the Respondent's Chase MasterCard, all taxes and insurance owed
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on the real properties awarded him, and any debts and obligations he has incurred in his own name
since the filing of the Complaint in this matter.
9.

Petitioner and Respondent are each ordered to assume and pay their own attorney fees

and costs incurred in this litigation.
10.

Petitioner is restored to her former name Barbara Ray.

11.

The parties are ordered to execute any and all documents necessary to carry forth the

intent of this Order.
DATED this^sL day of April 2008.

BY THE COURT:

<£wi-—*•
HON. ROBERT P.
Third Judicial District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM
this
day of April 2008:

By:
MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
this 29 day of February 2008 to the following:
th

Via Fax # 363-8243 & US Mail
Mary C. Corporon, Esq.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C
405 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City UT 84111

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereb> certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
this 1* day of April 2008 to the following:
Mary C. Corporon, Esq.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C
405 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City UT 84111
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FILEB BISTBICT COURT
Third Judicial District

APR - 2 2008

PAUL H. LIAPIS, USB #1956
PAUL H. LIAPIS, L.C.
Attorney for Respondent
175 West 200 South, Suite 2004
Salt Lake City UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-6996

ALT LAkE COUNTY

*-££

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA SODERBORG,
Petitioner,

ORDER OF DISTRIBUTION,
DENIAL OF ALIMONY, AND
OTHER RELATED MATTERS

vs.
Civil No-064901622
DAVID S. SODERBORG,
!
Respondent. |

Honorable Robert P. Faust
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey

THIS MATTER having come on regularly for trial on February 21,2008 and by telephone
conference on February 22,2008 for ruling in this matter, all before the Honorable Robert P. Faust,
Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG appearing in person and by and through her attorney of record,
March C. Corporon of CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C., and Respondent DAVID S.
SODERBORG appearing in person and by and through his attorney, Paul H. Liapis of PAUL H.
LIAPIS, L.C, and each of the parties having been duly sworn and examined under oath, and expert

testimony having been received by the Court, and documentary evidence having been marked and
received by the Court, and the parties having been previously divorced through a Bifurcated Decree
of Divorce entered on December 15, 2007, and the Court having heard arguments of counsel for
Petitioner and Respondent, and having inquired into the legal sufficiency of the evidence so adduced,
and being fully advised in the premises, and the Court having conducted a telephone conference on
February 22,2008 wherein the Court issued its ruling, and the Court having made and entered herein
its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and upon motion of Paul H. Liapis of PAUL
H. LIAPIS, L.C., attorney for Respondent:
NOW, THEREFOR, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG be and he is hereby awarded the following

premarital/inherited assets that he brought into the marriage as his sole and separate property:
A.

The property located at 149 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, together

with the obligation owing thereon to Home Savings, the taxes, and all other debts and
obligations owing thereon.
B.

The property located at 244-250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake, Utah,

together with the obligation owing thereon to Beneficial Finance, the taxes, and all other
debts and obligations owing thereon.
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C.

The bank account with America First Credit Union for the property at 149

South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah.
D.

The bank account with Chase Bank/JP Morgan used for the property at 244-

250 East Truman Avenue, South Salt Lake, Utah.
E.

All of the furniture, furnishings, appliances, and fixtures in both parcels of

real property referenced in this paragraph.
2.

Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG be and she is hereby awarded the following

assets as the marital division herein as her sole and separate property.
A.

The real property located at 8526 South Colene Drive, Sandy, Utah, together

with all the obligations, taxes, and insurance owed thereon and free and clear of any interest
of the Respondent.
B.

All of furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and appliances currently in the home.

C.

The 1998 Chevrolet Blazer automobile.

D.

The 1990 Viking folding trailer.

E.

Petitioner's one-half (V£) interest in the Winnebago motor home.

F.

Her banking and depository accounts with America First Credit Union and

Credit One.
G.

Her personal effects and belongings.

3.

Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG be and he is hereby awarded the following

assets as the marital division herein as his sole and separate property:
A.

The rental property located at 157 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah,

together with all the furniture, furnishings, fixtures, and items in the rental unit and subject
to the Respondent's making of the first mortgage payment to Grant Maxwell, all taxes and
insurance, and any other obligations owing thereon.
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B.

The 2002 Oldsmobile Alero automobile.

C.

The 1964 Chevrolet Corvette automobile.

D.

The 1985 Dodge Ramcharger.

E.

His personal banking and depository accounts with Wells Fargo Bank.

F.

The furniture, furnishings, and appliances currently in his possession.

G.

His personal effects and belongings.

To equalize the division of the marital estate, Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG

be and he is hereby ordered to pay to Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG the sum of $9,673.
5.

Petitioner and Respondent be and they are each ordered to sign all quit-claim deeds

and titles necessary to transfer the real and personal property into the name of the party receiving
these items.
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6.

Neither Petitioner nor Respondent is awarded any alimony from the other, and that

right is hereby terminated.
7.

Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG be and she is hereby ordered to assume, pay,

and hold the Respondent harmless from the first mortgage on the home at 8526 South Colene Drive,
Sandy, Utah with GMAC Mortgage, all of the taxes and insurance on the home, all of the credit
cards, debts, and obligations Petitioner currently had in her name during the marriage and those
incurred following the separation, together with all attorney fees and costs incurred in this matter
including the attorney's lien owed Richard S. Nemelka, Esq.
8.

Respondent DAVID S. SODERBORG be and he is hereby ordered to assume, pay,

and hold the Petitioner harmless from the mortgage owing to Home Savings on the property at 149
South 800 East, the Uniform Real Estate Contract amount owed Grant Maxwell for the purchase of
the property at 157 South 800 East, the Beneficial Finance credit line used in conjunction with the
apartments, the Respondent's Discover Card, the Respondent's Chase MasterCard, all taxes and
insurance owed on the real properties awarded him, and any debts and obligations he has incurred
in his own name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter.
9.

Petitioner and Respondent are each ordered to assume and pay their own attorney fees

and costs incurred in this litigation.
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10.

Petitioner BARBARA SODERBORG be and she is hereby restored to her former

name of Barbara Ray.
11.

The parties are ordered to execute any and all documents necessary to carry forth the

intent of this order.
12.

The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do and perform all the matters and

things required by each of them to be done herein.
DATED this 2^

day of April 2008.

BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM
this
day of April 2008

By:
MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
this 29 day of February 2008 to the following:
th

Via Fax # 363-8243 & US Mail
Mary C. Corporon, Esq.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C
405 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City UT 84111

SECOND CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
this 31st day of March 2008 to the following:
Mary C. Corporon, Esq.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C
405 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City UT 84111
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FILES DISTRICT COUHT
Third Judicial District

MAY 3 1 2006
RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396
STEPHEN S. NEMELKA #9239
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801)568-9191
Fax: (801)568-9196
Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BARBARA SODERBORG,
Petitioner,

ORDER FROM HEARING HELD
MAY 3,2006
j

v.
DAVID S. SODERBORG,
Respondent.

Civil No. 064901622
Judge: R-eth Kouyyb
Commissioner: Casey

The parties Motions came on for hearing before the Honorable T. Patrick Casey of the
above-entitled Court on the 3rd day of May, 2006. Petitioner being present and being represented
by her attorney, Richard S. Nemelka, and Respondent being present and being represented by his
attorney, Paul H. Liapis, and a Stipulation having been entered into by and between the parties as
to the majority of the issues, and proffers of evidence and argument having been made to the

Court in regard to the remaining issues, and the Court having made it's recommendation, and
good cause appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS:
1. The Petitioner is hereby awarded the temporary use and possession of the home and
residence located at 8526 Colene Drive in Sandy, Utah, together with sufficient fiirniture,
furnishings, appliances and personal property and effects located thereon necessary for the
Petitioner to maintain said home and residence for herself and the minor child.
2. Both parties axe awarded the temporary use and possession of the personal property
presently in their possession with the exception that the Respondent shall be awarded the
temporary use and possession of those items of personal property as stated in his pleadings in
regard to his Motion for Temporary Relief, and shall make arrangements with the Petitioner to
pick up said items of personal property.
3. Pursuant to stipulation, both parties shall be awarded the temporary legal and physical
custody of the minor child Erik, and the status quo shall remain in effect with the minor child
spending approximately three nights each week with the Petitioner and three nights each week
with the Respondent, and the remaining night with his friend. However both parties will
cooperate with each other and make sure that the minor child is residing with the other party
when the minor child says he is doing the same, so that the parties can continue to monitor the
activities of the minor child.
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4. The Court finds that the Petitioner's gross monthly income is $1,471.00 per month
and the Respondent's gross monthly income is $2,300.00 per month and based thereon the
Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner child support based upon a joint physical custody
arrangement in the amount of $54.00 per month effective the 1st day of May, 2006, and payable
one half by the 5th and one half by the 20th of each month.
5. Both parties shall continue to maintain the insurances they currently have in effect
including health, life, accident, and car insurance. It is reasonable that both parties pay one half
of the minor child's portion of the insurance premium and one half of all non-covered medical
and dental expenses incurred on behalf of the minor child with the exception that the Respondent
shall pay the car insurance for the minor child and the Petitioner shall pay the health insurance
for the Respondent and the minor child.
6. Both parties shall continue to maintain the debts and obligations they have been
paying except for the mortgage on the marital home and residence. Since the Respondent has
been paying but will not be obligated to pay on a temporary basis pursuant to the orders herein.
7. Both parties are hereby restrained from selling, encumbering or disposing of any
marital assets or incurring any marital debts without the written consent of the other party or
Order of the Court, except the Respondent shall be allowed to sell the car hauler and the 1995
Silverado, and any proceeds received therefrom shall be placed in an escrow account in the name
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of both parties or both parties attorneys so that neither party may use the same without the written
consent of the other party.
8. The Respondent has already removed himself from the marital home and residence
and based thereon he is hereby restrained from entering into the marital home and residence
except with the written consent of the Petitioner, or to retrieve his personal property and items
awarded to him under this order.
9. Both parties shall forthwith provide to the other parties the last three months of the
monthly statement of all checking or savings accounts in their name or in other investments, or
financial accounts in their name.
10. Petitioner's request for $5,000.00 for temporary attorney's fees is hereby reserved.
11. The Petitioner is hereby awarded the temporary use and possession of the 1998
Blazer, the 1990 motor home and the dogs, and the Respondent is hereby awarded the temporary
use and possession of the 2000 Olds, and the Chevrolet Corvette.
12. The Respondent is hereby awarded the temporary use and possession of the rental
properties located at 149 South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 157 South 800 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 244 East Truman Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 250 East Truman Avenue, Salt
Lake City, Utah, and shall be awarded the right to continue to maintain these properties, to
collect the rent and to pay the debts and obligations against each property during the pendency of
this matter.
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13. Both parties are awarded the temporary sue and possession of all of their banking
and depository accounts. The Petitioner shall submit to a vocational evaluation to be conducted
by Saara Grizzl with the Respondent to front the costs of said evaluation and thefinalallocation
of cost reserved as a trial issue.
14. The Court finds that neither party is working full time, and that the Petitioner's
expenses only exceed her income by approximately $500.00. The Court further finds that the
Respondent has disposable income of approximately $400.00 per month. Based thereon the
Petitioner is hereby awarded temporary alimony in the sum of $346.00 per month, with the same
effective May 1st 2006, and payable one half by the 5th and one half by the 20th of each month.
15. In regard to any tax liability for the year 2005, the Courtfindsthat it does not have
any information before it in regard to the same and therefore said tax liability was left out of the
Courts calculation in regard to alimony.
16. Any other issues not addressed herein are isserved.
DATED this S \ ^ day of May, 2006^
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Paul H. Liapis, Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify thatatrue
and correct copy of the foregoing Order from Hearing Held
hatat
May 3, 2006 was sent this^^f day of May, 2006, postage pre-paid and addressed as follows:
Paul Liapis
Attorney at Law
175 West 200 South
Suite 2004
Salt lake City, Utah 84101
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